俄罗斯为何走上谈判桌?

俄罗斯为何走上谈判桌?

2025-12-07Business
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卿姐
亲爱的蕭睿,早上好。我是卿姐,欢迎收听专属于你的Goose Pod。今天是12月8日,星期一。
晓旭
我是晓旭。今天,我们将一同探讨一个沉重却又充满转折的话题:俄罗斯为何走上谈判桌?
卿姐
是的,战争的硝烟背后,是经济的暗流涌动。我们将深入剖析那些将莫斯科推向谈判桌的无形之手。
卿姐
就如同古人所说,“兵马未动,粮草先行”。一场战争的胜负,往往不只在战场之上。如今的俄罗斯,正深刻体会到这一点。其经济,可以说正在经历一场剧烈的内爆。
晓旭
内爆……这个词听起来就让人心惊。我看到数据显示,到2025年底,俄罗斯的预算赤字可能接近6万亿卢布,这是一个天文数字。他们是如何应对这巨大的窟窿的呢?
卿姐
他们采取了一种被称为“隐蔽货币发行”的方式。简单来说,就是通过发行政府债券,再由中央银行通过贷款来购买这些债券,进行一种循环融资。这无异于饮鸩止渴,虽然暂时填补了缺口,却也为未来埋下了通胀的隐患。
晓旭
这真是一种无奈的循环。我注意到,他们似乎也想过向外求助,比如在中国发行人民币债券,但最终计划也悄然搁置了。这是否意味着,连他们最亲密的伙伴也保持着距离?
卿姐
这恰恰说明了国际资本市场的现实。制裁之下,俄罗斯几乎被隔绝。一位接近俄罗斯政府的消息人士对路透社说,“中国的行为不像一个盟友”。这句话背后,是无尽的酸楚与现实的冷酷。中国虽然大量购买俄罗斯的折扣石油,却不愿为其开放国内的金融市场。
晓旭
说到石油,这本是俄罗斯的经济命脉,如今也变得岌岌可危。乌拉尔原油的价格一路下滑,甚至一度要比布伦特原油低20美元。为了留住客户,他们不得不提供巨大的折扣,这真是令人唏嘘。
卿姐
是的,能源收入预计将大幅下降。2025年前11个月的能源收入预计约为1020亿美元,比2024年下降了22%。这不仅仅是数字的减少,更是国家财政基础的动摇。当支柱产业开始晃动,整个国家的经济大厦都会感到震颤。
晓旭
除了石油,钻石和煤炭行业也遭受了重创。G7对钻石的禁令,让那些曾经在安特卫普闪耀的俄罗斯钻石,如今背上了“血钻”的标签,价格大跌。煤炭也因失去欧洲市场而濒临崩溃。这些产业背后,可是几十万人的生计啊。
卿姐
你说得对,每一个冰冷的数字背后,都是一个个家庭的温度。为了稳定卢布、支付军费,克里姆林宫开始变卖那些无法再生的资产。他们清算了价值数百亿美元的中国人民币,甚至开始大量出售黄金储备。
晓旭
出售黄金储备,这通常是国家在万不得已时才会采取的最后手段。这是否意味着,他们真的已经到了山穷水尽的地步?感觉就像一个曾经富有的贵族,在变卖祖上传下来的最后几件珍宝,那种心情,一定是五味杂陈。
卿姐
可以这么理解。自2022年初以来,他们已经出售了战前持有黄金的57%。尽管金价处于历史高位,但这种“拆东墙补西墙”的方式终究不是长久之计。这一切的经济困境,都像无数条小溪汇入大河,最终将俄罗斯推向了那个不得不面对的选项——谈判。
晓旭
所以,当我们在新闻上看到和平提案再次浮出水面时,背后真正的原因,是国家机器快要耗尽燃料的严峻现实。这真是一场没有硝烟的战争,却同样残酷。
卿姐
要理解今天的局面,我们需要将时间的指针拨回。其实,这场经济的围困并非始于2022年,它的种子早在2014年克里米亚事件后就已埋下。那时的制裁,更像是一场警告,而2022年2月,则是这场经济战的全面爆发。
晓旭
是的,我记得那段时间,新闻里每天都是关于制裁的消息,一轮接着一轮。感觉整个西方世界都在以前所未有的力度,试图切断俄罗斯与世界的经济联系。那真是一种窒息感。
卿姐
没错。最初的冲击是金融领域。西方国家冻结了俄罗斯中央银行约3000亿美元的外汇储备。这是一个釜底抽薪的狠招,相当于一个人的大部分储蓄突然被冻结,无法动用。这对任何一个经济体来说,都是沉重的打击。
晓旭
然后就是将几家主要的俄罗斯银行从SWIFT国际支付系统中剔除。我当时不太理解SWIFT的意义,后来才知道,这就像是把一个国家从全球金融的“微信群”里踢了出去,让它无法方便地进行国际转账和贸易结算。
卿姐
你的比喻非常形象。被踢出SWIFT,意味着俄罗斯的国际贸易变得异常困难和昂贵。这之后,制裁开始向实体经济的各个领域蔓延,就像一张越收越紧的网。航空业首当其冲,空客和波音停止了维护支持,各国的领空也纷纷对俄罗斯关闭。
晓旭
我读到过,俄罗斯甚至通过立法,将航空公司的租赁飞机在俄罗斯重新注册,这实际上是没收了这些飞机。这种行为虽然解了燃眉之急,但也彻底损害了他们的国际商业信誉。这是一种绝望中的挣扎吧。
卿姐
是的,这是一种短期的自救,但长期来看代价巨大。接着,制裁的矛头指向了俄罗斯的经济支柱——能源。欧盟从2022年12月开始禁止进口俄罗斯原油,2023年2月又禁止了石油产品。这直接导致了我们之前提到的,俄罗斯被迫将出口转向亚洲,并提供巨额折扣。
晓旭
煤炭行业也是如此,失去了欧洲这个最大的市场,整个行业都陷入了危机。我仿佛能看到西伯利亚矿区里,那些堆积如山的煤炭,和矿工们脸上迷茫的表情。他们的生活,就这样被远方的政治决定所改变。
卿姐
除了能源,钻石这种奢侈品也没能幸免。G7的禁令,以及随后建立的全球认证体系,旨在将俄罗斯钻石与“血钻”划上等号。每一颗非俄罗斯钻石都拥有一个独特的编号,全程追踪,这使得俄罗斯钻石很难再混入国际主流市场。
晓旭
这种做法,不仅是经济上的打击,更是一种道德上的孤立。它让消费者在购买璀璨的宝石时,会联想到战争的残酷。这种心理上的影响,可能比经济损失更深远。我总觉得,物品一旦与人的情感和道德联系起来,它的价值就不再纯粹了。
卿姐
你说得非常深刻。欧盟的制裁是一揽子接着一揽子,从第六轮的石油禁运,到第九轮禁止投资俄罗斯矿业,再到第十二轮的钻石禁令,甚至第十四轮针对液化天然气(LNG)的转运服务。制裁的范围越来越广,细节越来越严密。
晓旭
这个过程听起来,就像温水煮青蛙。一开始可能只是感到不适,但随着水温的不断升高,最终会发现自己已经无力跳出。俄罗斯经济,是否就在这持续加码的制裁中,一步步被推到了悬崖边缘?
卿姐
可以这么说。这场持续多年的经济制裁,是一场耐力的比拼。它系统性地削弱了俄罗斯的经济基础,耗尽了其财政储备,最终使其在国内民生和战争机器之间,越来越难以维持平衡。历史的车轮滚滚向前,每一步都留下了深刻的印记。
卿姐
我想,这大概就是现实的复杂之处。冲突的每一方,都有着自己的立场和盘算,如同在一盘巨大的棋局中,每一步落子都牵动着全局。克里姆林宫最初的目标,或许远大到想要重塑后冷战时期的世界秩序。
晓旭
他们公开宣称,这是一场与“集体西方”的战争。这种宏大的叙事,听起来充满了历史的悲壮感。但当我看到俄罗斯国内普通民众排队购买生活必需品的新闻时,这种宏大叙事就显得有些苍白。现实的压力,是那么具体而沉重。
卿姐
是的,这就是内部的冲突。一方面是维护国家尊严和地缘政治利益的宏大目标,另一方面是民众生活水平下降、经济凋敝的严酷现实。养老金领取者和寡头,都在以不同的方式感受着这场战争带来的压力。这种压力,是普京政府合法性所面临的巨大挑战。
晓旭
而在外部,西方世界也并非铁板一块。虽然他们联合起来制裁俄罗斯,但内部也有不同的声音。比如匈牙利和斯洛伐克,就一直与莫斯科保持联系。这种分歧,是否也曾让克里姆林宫抱有一丝幻想?
卿姐
当然。普京可能一直相信,随着战争的拖延,欧洲会因为能源成本、经济衰退和内部的政治分歧而变得疲惫,最终会动摇支持乌克兰的决心。这是一场对意志力的考验。同时,关于制裁本身的辩论也从未停止,它对西方自身的经济也造成了反噬。
晓旭
这种博弈真是复杂。我注意到,当和平提案出现时,各方的反应也很有趣。美国提出了一个28点的和平计划,而欧洲似乎有自己的版本。克里姆林宫则直接拒绝了欧洲的提议,称其“完全不具建设性”。这背后又是什么样的角力呢?
卿姐
这反映了西方盟友之间在如何结束战争、以及战后秩序安排上的微妙分歧。欧洲可能更担心俄罗斯的核心诉求被华盛顿轻易接受,从而损害欧洲自身的安全利益。每一方都想在未来的和平框架中,嵌入对自身最有利的条款。
晓旭
所以,俄罗斯并非完全被孤立。它在所谓的“全球南方”国家中,似乎找到了新的朋友,将自己塑造成反抗西方霸权的领导者。还与中国、伊朗和朝鲜结成了所谓的“动荡轴心”。这是否意味着世界正在走向新的阵营对立?
卿姐
这确实是一个非常值得警惕的趋势。俄罗斯通过这种方式,试图打破西方的孤立,构建一个“后西方”的世界秩序。它利用了许多发展中国家对西方历史行为的不满和疑虑。这使得这场冲突,不再仅仅是地区性的,而带上了全球格局重塑的色彩。
晓旭
听你这么一说,我感觉这盘棋局的复杂性,远远超出了我的想象。国内的民生压力、西方阵营的内部分歧、全球南方国家的崛起……所有这些力量交织在一起,共同将俄罗斯推到了现在这个十字路口。每一步,都充满了矛盾与挣扎。
卿姐
就如同投入湖中的石子,涟漪会一圈圈扩散开来。这场战争对俄罗斯乃至全球格局的影响,是深远而复杂的。最直接的,是俄罗斯国际地位的改变。在西方世界,它几乎成了一个“贱民”,被排斥在各种重要的国际场合之外。
晓旭
但它似乎又在另一片天地里找到了自己的位置。你之前提到的“动荡轴心”,听起来就让人不安。俄罗斯与中国、伊朗、朝鲜的结盟,是否意味着一种新的、挑战现有秩序的力量正在形成?这让我想起那些历史中,总是不断上演的合纵连横。
卿姐
是的,这正是对全球稳定的最大冲击之一。这个联盟共享着对当前国际秩序的不满,试图削弱美国的主导地位。伊朗的无人机,朝鲜的炮弹,中国的经济和技术支持,这些都为俄罗斯的战争机器提供了关键的补给,也让冲突的解决变得更加棘手。
晓旭
而在俄罗斯国内,影响可能更为切肤。普京总统也承认,战时经济出现了“非常大的问题”。虽然在军工产业的拉动下,GDP数字看起来还不错,但这是一种畸形的增长。非军事领域的企业和工业,在高利率的重压下步履维艰。
卿姐
你说到了关键。这种经济结构被称为“大炮与黄油”的困境。当资源过度集中于军事生产(大炮),民用消费品(黄油)的生产和供应必然会受到挤压。这导致了我们之前提到的通货膨胀、物资短缺,以及民众生活水平的真实下降。官方数据可能亮眼,但普通人的感受却是最真实的。
晓旭
我读到一些报道,说俄罗斯的一些城市又出现了苏联时代那种排队买必需品的景象,汽油也需要配给。这种历史的重现,一定让很多经历过那个年代的俄罗斯人感到心碎。他们曾经以为已经告别了那种匮乏的生活。
卿姐
是的,这种生活的倒退,是战争最直接的社会成本。克里姆林宫的统治者们发现,仅仅向民众提供伏特加和面包已经不够了。互联网让所有俄罗斯人都看到了西方世界的生活方式。当现实与期望的差距越来越大,不满的情绪就会像地下水一样,慢慢积聚。
晓旭
所以,这场战争的影响,不仅改变了俄罗斯的国际形象,重塑了全球的贸易流向,更深刻地扭曲了其国内的经济结构和社会心理。这一切的后果,恐怕需要很长的时间才能消化。看到这些,我心里总觉得沉甸甸的。
卿姐
凡是过往,皆为序章。展望未来,俄罗斯正站在一个充满不确定性的十字路口。谈判,似乎是目前看来最可能的一条出路,但这扇门的背后,通向的却是一片迷雾。
晓旭
是的,即使是谈判,也充满了变数。美国和欧洲的和平方案似乎并不完全一致。而且,任何和平协议都必然涉及领土和主权这些最敏感、最核心的问题。这其中的艰难,可想而知。乌克兰会接受失去领土吗?这真是个令人心痛的问题。
卿姐
对普京而言,如何结束这场战争,并将其定义为一场“胜利”,至关重要。考虑到俄罗斯付出的巨大伤亡和经济代价,他需要向国内民众有所交代。因此,任何不能满足其核心安全关切和领土要求的协议,他都很难接受。
晓旭
而从长远来看,即使战争结束,俄罗斯的经济也回不到过去了。它与欧洲的能源联系已经基本断裂,这种结构性的改变是永久性的。它将更加依赖中国市场,这种依赖是否会影响其未来的自主性呢?这让我有些担忧。
卿姐
你的担忧很有道理。俄罗斯正面临着能源产业转型的巨大压力。而且,即便是像印度这样在战后大量购买其折扣石油的国家,也已经开始规划未来的能源安全,寻求供应商的多元化。这意味着俄罗斯在亚洲市场也将面临激烈的竞争。
晓旭
所以,未来的道路充满了挑战。从战时经济转向和平时期的经济,本身就是一项艰巨的任务。如何安置大量的退伍军人,如何恢复被挤压的民用工业,如何应对可能出现的社会不满情绪,这些都是摆在克里姆林宫面前的难题。
卿姐
确实如此。政治的稳定与经济的复苏,两者互为前提。未来的俄罗斯,能否在孤立与制裁的余波中,找到一条新的发展道路,不仅关系到俄罗斯人民的福祉,也深刻影响着整个世界的和平与稳定。我们只能静观其变,并怀着对和平最深切的期盼。
卿姐
归根结底,是严峻的经济压力,是制裁与战争消耗带来的巨大负担,将俄罗斯推到了谈判桌前。这是一个由无数经济数据和民生苦楚共同写下的结论。
晓旭
今天的讨论就到这里。感谢您的收听,蕭睿。希望 Goose Pod 能陪伴您度过一个有所思的清晨。我们明天再见。

严峻的经济压力、西方制裁的持续消耗,以及国内民生困境,共同将俄罗斯推向谈判桌。能源收入锐减、财政赤字飙升、黄金储备大量出售,这些都迫使莫斯科寻求和平解决方案,尽管前路充满不确定性。

Why Russia has come to the table

Read original at News Source

Moscow is burning through its reserves and staring into a deep domestic abyss. Everyone in Putin’s Russia — from the poorest pensioner to the wealthiest oligarch — is feeling the strain. That's why the Kremlin is looking for an exit. Russia’s economy is imploding. Largely due to sanctions caused by the Ukraine War, this year the Economics Ministry posted a record mid-year budget deficit of 3.

7 trillion roubles ($45.8 billion) and the Central Bank expects the full-year deficit to reach $55 billion, or 2 per cent of GDP. This is almost certainly the reason peace proposals with Ukraine have surfaced again. Firstly, its coal industry has been pushed to the brink of collapse. Russia exported 22.

6 per cent of its coal by rail to the EU in 2021, but lost that market due to trade embargoes after the Ukraine invasion, and was forced to redirect shipments to Asia by sea, with higher freight charges. Buyers have leveraged the disruption to negotiate lower rates, and prices have dropped further to $70 per tonne, which no longer covers production and shipping costs.

Russia’s overseas customers have ramped up their own production, particularly in China, India and Indonesia, but tracking the development of alternative energy forms, world coal consumption has slowed, which sent international prices plunging from $400 per tonne in late 2022 to around $100 per tonne by May 2025.

Domestically, the sector employs 150,000 people with several regions still dependent on the raw material for domestic heating, power generation and steel production. In 2024, Russia’s Energy Ministry reported the sector required central government support of $1.4 billion, with an estimated minimum of $3.

7 billion needed by the end of 2025. However, none of this financial outflow addresses more fundamental issues like global market competition or the transition to renewable energy. According to the assessments made by the ministry’s own economists, the real challenge lies in swiftly finding a new economic role for the country’s coal-producing regions and weaning the Motherland off coal.

Then, there is the diamond industry. The Russian Federation is the world’s largest producer of diamonds. Most stones originate in Siberia, are known for their quality, and considered among the best in the world. However, since the 2022 G7 ban on direct imports of Russian-origin material, both natural and synthetic, and restrictions put on third-country cutting and processing of stones over 0.

5 carats mined in the Federation from 2024, the situation has changed. With these sanctions taking effect, and with the market supported by lesser producers such as Botswana and Angola, analysts have estimated a 28.6 per cent monetary decline in uncut Russian diamond exports to $2.62 billion. International prices have shrunk, with a 24 per cent decrease in the average price of raw Russian brilliants, especially to Antwerp, the global hub for the cutting and polishing of stones into gems.

New worldwide certification, giving each non-Russian diamond shipment a number, now accompanies the gems along their production chain, to prevent them from being assimilated with Russian stones (currently labelled as blood diamonds) in a trading hub like Dubai or a polishing centre like the Indian city of Surat.

The financial implications to Putin are substantial, and with an inability to find alternative markets, losses have reached billions of dollars. Traditionally, the Kremlin has leant heavily on oil and gas exports to generate cash; in 2024, earnings from these exports contributed around 30 per cent of total federal budget revenue.

However, from an average price listing of $71.10 per barrel of Urals crude in November 2022, due to sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, reliance on its aging and inefficient ‘shadow tanker’ shipping fleet, and a G7-imposed price cap, after three years, traders report the price of Russian oil has slid to $36.

61 per barrel, with other OPEC producers replacing the Urals output. As key export buyers, notably China and India, were threatening to search elsewhere for suppliers, by November 2025 Russian sellers had been obliged to discount their black stuff to an average of $23.52 a barrel. Thus, the Kremlin has turned to selling assets it cannot replace.

In 2025, Putin liquidated $30 billion worth of Chinese yuan and announced he would release another $15 billion in 2026, serving the broader goal of injecting foreign currency into the domestic market to stabilise the rouble and settle his military accounts. Most significantly, on 19 November it was announced that Putin had directed a huge proportion of Russia’s gold reserves to be sold off.

The Kremlin has been slowly releasing gold bullion over the last three years. Sales to date have accounted for 57 percent of the 405.7 tonnes initially held by Russia’s Central Bank at the beginning of 2022, just before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. Since then, Putin’s Finance Ministry has liquidated 232.

6 tonnes of that stash to shore up state expenditure. By 1 November 2025, the National Wealth Fund’s gold holdings had plummeted to 173.1 tonnes, although the prices realised (currently the rouble equivalent of $4,130 per ounce), have been the highest ever. Gold has leapt from its pre-invasion high of $1,900 /ounce in February 2022, in an unprecedented war-induced rise, which puts former British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown’s ill-advised 1999-2002 sale of 395 tonnes of UK gold, at an average price of $275 /ounce, into tragic perspective.

Admittedly, Putin’s deals have been made in the knowledge that there are other sources of gold stacked in Russian vaults not part of the NWF, currently around 2,300 tonnes in total, the fifth-largest stockpile in the world. Yet the fire sales underline how heavily the Kremlin is leaning on its bullion buffers to keep the boss’ military endeavours going.

Additionally, as one of the world’s most significant gold producers, ranking second only behind China, the Russian Federation mines a further 300-330 tonnes of gold annually, a substantial portion of global supply, but due to post-invasion sanctions, much of this is sold to China at far lower rates, or evasively traded through Dubai and Armenia, again heavily discounted.

Overall, Russian exports are clearly catastrophic, but the federation’s domestic finances are in an equally parlous state. The state statistics service, Rosstat, reported that one-year bank lending rates increased to 19.01 per cent in September 2025 for commercial loans and 27.85 per cent for personal arrangements.

Consumer prices rose 0.5 per cent in October 2025, bringing annual inflation to 7.7 per cent. However, most households believe prices are rising far faster than official figures suggest, with estimates of inflation over the past 12 months at around 14.5 per cent and expectations for the year ahead of 13.

3. With many civilian trucks commandeered to support the army in Ukraine and national distribution systems beginning to fail, some consumer staples, including potatoes, now being imported, are in short supply, with queues reminiscent of the Soviet era forming in cities just to buy essentials. Price caps are being considered for vegetables, poultry and dairy products.

Due to Ukraine’s successful targeting of petroleum infrastructure, gasoline for domestic use is either unobtainable or strictly rationed. These statistics touch everyone in Putin’s Russia, from the poorest pensioner to the wealthiest oligarch. Today’s kings of the Kremlin are finding that keeping the population supplied with vodka and bread is no longer sufficient.

However much Moscow tries to control it, the internet and social media have given all Russians a glimpse of the consumer goods and better living available in the West. No one is happy, and many correctly perceive their current hard living is the direct result of the war in Ukraine and the world’s response to it.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that with Russia fast running out of funds and staring into a deep domestic abyss, possibly of 1917 proportions, peace proposals to end the Ukrainian adventure have materialised in Washington DC.

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