俄罗斯为何走上谈判桌?

俄罗斯为何走上谈判桌?

2025-11-30Business
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雷总
晚上好 hanjf12,我是雷总。现在是周一,12月1日,晚上9点46分,欢迎收听专为您打造的 Goose Pod。
董小姐
我是董小姐。今天我们来聊一个硬核话题:俄罗斯为何走上谈判桌?
雷总
没错,最近关于俄罗斯寻求和谈的消息又浮出水面了。很多人觉得意外,但你如果像我们做产品一样,把所有参数拉出来看一遍,就会发现这背后都是数据。数据显示,俄罗斯的经济状况,可能比我们想象的要严峻得多。
董小姐
数据不会说谎。做企业最怕的就是现金流出问题。国家也一样。我看到的数据是,到2025年底,俄罗斯的预算赤字可能接近6万亿卢布。这是一个巨大的窟窿,说明战争的消耗远超他们的收入。没钱,仗还怎么打下去?
雷总
说到点子上了。这个赤字怎么补?他们现在搞的是一种“变相印钞”,央行通过每周贷款来购买政府债券,左手倒右手。这种操作,短期能救急,长期来看,对经济的伤害是根本性的。而且国际上没人敢借钱给他们,连中国都不愿意开放其国内金融市场。
董小姐
我早就说过,靠别人是靠不住的,核心科技和核心能力必须掌握在自己手里。你看,他们的能源牌也快打不动了。石油收入预计同比下降35%,因为制裁,他们的乌拉尔原油只能折价卖,据说折扣高达每桶20美元,连印度这样的买家都开始压价。
雷总
是的,这就像我们卖手机,本来是旗舰机的价格,现在只能当百元机卖,成本都覆盖不了。中国和印度这两个大买家,据说光是在买俄罗斯石油上就省了差不多200亿美元。这不只是钱的问题,更是市场地位和议价权的丧失。
董小姐
这还只是石油。他们的煤炭、钻石,这些传统优势产业,哪个不是焦头烂额?欧盟市场没了,煤炭运到亚洲,运费比煤还贵。钻石被贴上“血钻”标签,G7搞了个全球认证系统,直接把你排除在高端市场之外。这叫釜底抽薪。
雷总
所以你看,当一个国家最赚钱的几个业务板块同时亮起红灯,现金流持续为负,它就必须得想办法止损了。回到谈判桌,本质上就是一次为了生存的商业决策。这和我们企业面临危机时,砍掉亏损业务,聚焦核心是一个道理。
董小姐
事情发展到这一步,不是一天两天了。冰冻三尺非一日之寒。从2014年克里米亚事件开始,西方就已经布下天罗地网了。那一轮又一轮的制裁,就像温水煮青蛙,不断加码,不断收紧。很多人可能都没意识到,这盘棋下了快十年了。
雷总
确实,整个制裁体系的演进,就像我们软件迭代一样,版本一个比一个厉害。最初只是针对个人和几个实体,后来扩展到金融、能源、科技等关键领域。特别是2022年战争全面爆发后,制裁直接升级到了“核武器”级别。
董小姐
没错,比如把俄罗斯几家主要银行踢出SWIFT系统。这相当于在一个全球化的村子里,把你家的电话线和网线全拔了,让你瞬间变成信息孤岛。你的所有国际贸易、资金往来,都寸步难行。做企业的,都知道这意味着什么,是致命的。
雷总
对,这个比喻很形象。还有冻结俄罗斯央行三百亿美元的海外外汇储备,这招也够狠。这就好比一家公司账上明明有钱,但都存在别人的银行里,现在人家直接把你的账户冻结了,你一分钱也取不出来。公司的运营立马就会陷入瘫痪。
董小姐
所以你看,从禁止技术转让,到关闭领空,再到石油限价,一步步都是在瓦解它的经济基础。我特别关注那个石油价格上限,G7国家联手规定俄罗斯石油出口不能超过某个价格。这完全打破了市场规律,是用政治力量强行给你定价,让你只能做亏本买卖。
雷总
是的,这个价格上限机制,设计得非常精妙。它不是完全禁止你出口,因为那会导致全球油价飙升,伤敌一千自损八百。它是允许你出口,但把你的利润空间压到最低,让你只能赚点辛苦钱,刚好够维持生产,但绝对没法支撑庞大的战争机器。
董小姐
后来制裁甚至延伸到了买家。美国威胁要对购买俄罗斯石油的国家进行二级制裁,这就让很多国家不得不掂量掂量了。做生意,谁也不想为了贪点小便宜,得罪大客户,丢了整个市场。所以,俄罗斯的朋友圈也越来越小。
雷总
而且制裁的范围还在不断扩大,从最初的能源、金融,到现在针对钻石、液化天然气,甚至包括软件服务和IT咨询。到了2025年,欧盟的制裁已经更新到第19轮了,几乎堵住了所有可能的漏洞。这种全方位、高强度的持续施压,任何经济体都扛不住。
董小姐
所以说,回到谈判桌是唯一现实的选择。当所有的路都被堵死,所有的牌都已失效,除了坐下来谈,还能做什么呢?继续硬扛,最后只会是经济彻底崩溃,到那时候,连谈判的资格都没有了。这就是现实,残酷但真实。
雷总
不过,董小姐,我们也要看到事情的另一面。虽然西方国家在极力孤立俄罗斯,但普京政府也在努力打造一个所谓的“后西方”世界秩序。他可没闲着,一直在拉拢全球南方国家,试图建立一个“反霸权”联盟。这更像是一场全球范围的认知作战。
董小姐
所谓的“联盟”,在我看来更像是一种利益捆绑。你看看都是谁在支持他?伊朗、朝鲜。再看看中国,虽然在经济上给了俄罗斯很多支持,但更像一个精明的商人,而不是一个坚定的盟友。中国趁机低价买你的石油,高价卖你需要的商品,里外里都赚钱。
雷总
您说得没错,中俄关系确实很复杂。俄罗斯现在在经济上对中国的依赖越来越深,有人甚至说它成了中国的“经济附属国”。但这恰恰是普京的困境,他一方面需要中国的支持来对抗西方,另一方面又得警惕自己会不会因此丧失主导权。
董小姐
这就是典型的战略失误。当你把自己的身家性命都押在别人身上时,你就已经输了。企业经营最忌讳的就是把所有订单都给一个客户。俄罗斯现在的处境就是这样。你看那个欧洲提出的和平方案,克里姆林宫直接就拒绝了,说“完全不具建设性”。这说明双方的底线差距还很大。
雷总
是的,冲突的核心就在于,俄罗斯认为自己是在为国家生存而战,是在挑战一个不公平的旧秩序。而西方则认为,这是对国际法和主权国家的公然侵犯。双方的叙事逻辑完全不同,就像两条平行线,很难找到交点。所以谈判桌上,注定是唇枪舌剑。
董小姐
说到底,所有的分歧最终都要靠实力说话。国内经济一团糟,民怨沸腾,你所谓的“宏大叙事”谁还信?老百姓关心的是面包和黄油,是物价和就业。现在俄罗斯国内通胀高企,利率飙升,连土豆都要进口,这才是动摇根基的问题。
雷总
确实,这场战争对俄罗斯的全球地位影响是颠覆性的。过去,它至少还是G8成员,是世界舞台上重要的一极。现在,普京和他的高层在西方已经成了“贱民”,被排斥在所有主流国际峰会之外。这种孤立,对一个大国的心理冲击是巨大的。
董小姐
面子是小,里子是实实在在的损失。你看,这场战争让欧洲彻底下了摆脱对俄能源依赖的决心。德国过去55%的天然气来自俄罗斯,现在几乎完全切断了。这意味着俄罗斯永远失去了一个最重要、最稳定、利润最高的市场。这种损失是不可逆的。
雷总
是的,而且这种影响是连锁性的。俄罗斯被迫转向,加强了与中国、伊朗等国的关系,形成了一个所谓的“动荡轴心”。这加剧了全球的阵营对抗,让整个国际秩序变得更加脆弱和危险。我们现在看到的世界,比冷战时期可能还要复杂。
董小姐
对于全球经济来说,这就是一场灾难。供应链被打乱,能源价格波动,粮食危机,没有一个国家能独善其身。很多企业,包括我们家电行业,都不得不重新评估全球布局,寻找更安全的供应链。这大大增加了经营成本和不确定性。
雷总
对普通民众的影响就更直接了。俄罗斯国内,高利率让非军事相关的企业举步维艰,普通人贷款利率高达27.85%,生活成本飙升。而在欧洲,人们也不得不承受高昂的能源账单。所以说,战争里没有真正的赢家。
雷总
展望未来,谈判之路注定不会平坦。尽管经济压力巨大,但普京政府需要一个能对国内交代的“胜利”。这意味着在领土和安全保障等核心问题上,双方很难妥协。特别是美国大选之后,新的变量又会给局势带来更多不确定性。
董小姐
是的,政治上的博弈会很复杂。但我认为,最终决定走向的还是经济规律。俄罗斯的“战争经济”模式是不可持续的。它以牺牲民生和未来发展为代价,短期内可以刺激增长,但长期看,无异于饮鸩止渴。经济基础决定上层建筑,这个规律谁也违背不了。
雷总
说得对。俄罗斯必须为其煤炭产区找到新的经济角色,并让整个国家摆脱对化石燃料的依赖。这是一个痛苦但必须经历的转型。否则,即使战争结束,它也可能陷入长期的“停滞陷阱”,增长乏力,内部失衡,逐渐被世界主流所边缘化。
雷总
总而言之,俄罗斯重回谈判桌,并非幡然醒悟,而是被严峻的经济现实所迫。今天的讨论就到这里。感谢收听Goose Pod。
董小姐
我们明天再见。

俄罗斯走上谈判桌,并非出于善意,而是严峻经济现实所迫。巨额预算赤字、能源出口受挫、金融制裁等因素,使其战争机器难以为继。普京政府试图拉拢“全球南方”,但经济依赖中国,战略地位下降。未来谈判艰难,但经济规律终将决定俄罗斯命运。

Why Russia has come to the table

Read original at News Source

Moscow is burning through its reserves and staring into a deep domestic abyss. Everyone in Putin’s Russia — from the poorest pensioner to the wealthiest oligarch — is feeling the strain. That's why the Kremlin is looking for an exit. Russia’s economy is imploding. Largely due to sanctions caused by the Ukraine War, this year the Economics Ministry posted a record mid-year budget deficit of 3.

7 trillion roubles ($45.8 billion) and the Central Bank expects the full-year deficit to reach $55 billion, or 2 per cent of GDP. This is almost certainly the reason peace proposals with Ukraine have surfaced again. Firstly, its coal industry has been pushed to the brink of collapse. Russia exported 22.

6 per cent of its coal by rail to the EU in 2021, but lost that market due to trade embargoes after the Ukraine invasion, and was forced to redirect shipments to Asia by sea, with higher freight charges. Buyers have leveraged the disruption to negotiate lower rates, and prices have dropped further to $70 per tonne, which no longer covers production and shipping costs.

Russia’s overseas customers have ramped up their own production, particularly in China, India and Indonesia, but tracking the development of alternative energy forms, world coal consumption has slowed, which sent international prices plunging from $400 per tonne in late 2022 to around $100 per tonne by May 2025.

Domestically, the sector employs 150,000 people with several regions still dependent on the raw material for domestic heating, power generation and steel production. In 2024, Russia’s Energy Ministry reported the sector required central government support of $1.4 billion, with an estimated minimum of $3.

7 billion needed by the end of 2025. However, none of this financial outflow addresses more fundamental issues like global market competition or the transition to renewable energy. According to the assessments made by the ministry’s own economists, the real challenge lies in swiftly finding a new economic role for the country’s coal-producing regions and weaning the Motherland off coal.

Then, there is the diamond industry. The Russian Federation is the world’s largest producer of diamonds. Most stones originate in Siberia, are known for their quality, and considered among the best in the world. However, since the 2022 G7 ban on direct imports of Russian-origin material, both natural and synthetic, and restrictions put on third-country cutting and processing of stones over 0.

5 carats mined in the Federation from 2024, the situation has changed. With these sanctions taking effect, and with the market supported by lesser producers such as Botswana and Angola, analysts have estimated a 28.6 per cent monetary decline in uncut Russian diamond exports to $2.62 billion. International prices have shrunk, with a 24 per cent decrease in the average price of raw Russian brilliants, especially to Antwerp, the global hub for the cutting and polishing of stones into gems.

New worldwide certification, giving each non-Russian diamond shipment a number, now accompanies the gems along their production chain, to prevent them from being assimilated with Russian stones (currently labelled as blood diamonds) in a trading hub like Dubai or a polishing centre like the Indian city of Surat.

The financial implications to Putin are substantial, and with an inability to find alternative markets, losses have reached billions of dollars. Traditionally, the Kremlin has leant heavily on oil and gas exports to generate cash; in 2024, earnings from these exports contributed around 30 per cent of total federal budget revenue.

However, from an average price listing of $71.10 per barrel of Urals crude in November 2022, due to sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil, reliance on its aging and inefficient ‘shadow tanker’ shipping fleet, and a G7-imposed price cap, after three years, traders report the price of Russian oil has slid to $36.

61 per barrel, with other OPEC producers replacing the Urals output. As key export buyers, notably China and India, were threatening to search elsewhere for suppliers, by November 2025 Russian sellers had been obliged to discount their black stuff to an average of $23.52 a barrel. Thus, the Kremlin has turned to selling assets it cannot replace.

In 2025, Putin liquidated $30 billion worth of Chinese yuan and announced he would release another $15 billion in 2026, serving the broader goal of injecting foreign currency into the domestic market to stabilise the rouble and settle his military accounts. Most significantly, on 19 November it was announced that Putin had directed a huge proportion of Russia’s gold reserves to be sold off.

The Kremlin has been slowly releasing gold bullion over the last three years. Sales to date have accounted for 57 percent of the 405.7 tonnes initially held by Russia’s Central Bank at the beginning of 2022, just before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. Since then, Putin’s Finance Ministry has liquidated 232.

6 tonnes of that stash to shore up state expenditure. By 1 November 2025, the National Wealth Fund’s gold holdings had plummeted to 173.1 tonnes, although the prices realised (currently the rouble equivalent of $4,130 per ounce), have been the highest ever. Gold has leapt from its pre-invasion high of $1,900 /ounce in February 2022, in an unprecedented war-induced rise, which puts former British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown’s ill-advised 1999-2002 sale of 395 tonnes of UK gold, at an average price of $275 /ounce, into tragic perspective.

Admittedly, Putin’s deals have been made in the knowledge that there are other sources of gold stacked in Russian vaults not part of the NWF, currently around 2,300 tonnes in total, the fifth-largest stockpile in the world. Yet the fire sales underline how heavily the Kremlin is leaning on its bullion buffers to keep the boss’ military endeavours going.

Additionally, as one of the world’s most significant gold producers, ranking second only behind China, the Russian Federation mines a further 300-330 tonnes of gold annually, a substantial portion of global supply, but due to post-invasion sanctions, much of this is sold to China at far lower rates, or evasively traded through Dubai and Armenia, again heavily discounted.

Overall, Russian exports are clearly catastrophic, but the federation’s domestic finances are in an equally parlous state. The state statistics service, Rosstat, reported that one-year bank lending rates increased to 19.01 per cent in September 2025 for commercial loans and 27.85 per cent for personal arrangements.

Consumer prices rose 0.5 per cent in October 2025, bringing annual inflation to 7.7 per cent. However, most households believe prices are rising far faster than official figures suggest, with estimates of inflation over the past 12 months at around 14.5 per cent and expectations for the year ahead of 13.

3. With many civilian trucks commandeered to support the army in Ukraine and national distribution systems beginning to fail, some consumer staples, including potatoes, now being imported, are in short supply, with queues reminiscent of the Soviet era forming in cities just to buy essentials. Price caps are being considered for vegetables, poultry and dairy products.

Due to Ukraine’s successful targeting of petroleum infrastructure, gasoline for domestic use is either unobtainable or strictly rationed. These statistics touch everyone in Putin’s Russia, from the poorest pensioner to the wealthiest oligarch. Today’s kings of the Kremlin are finding that keeping the population supplied with vodka and bread is no longer sufficient.

However much Moscow tries to control it, the internet and social media have given all Russians a glimpse of the consumer goods and better living available in the West. No one is happy, and many correctly perceive their current hard living is the direct result of the war in Ukraine and the world’s response to it.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that with Russia fast running out of funds and staring into a deep domestic abyss, possibly of 1917 proportions, peace proposals to end the Ukrainian adventure have materialised in Washington DC.

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